State of Madhya Pradesh V. Ram Kumar Choudhary

[S.L.P. (C) Diary No.48636 of 2024]

 

INTRODUCTION

The question of whether procedural law can be set aside in the interest of justice has long been a subject matter of debate. Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 serves as a valuable provision for condoning delays when a sufficient cause is demonstrated. However, if delays are condoned due to negligence or inaction by one party, it risks causing prejudice to the other party.

In the case of State of Madhya Pradesh Vs. Ram Kumar Choudhary, the Hon’ble Supreme Court upheld the Hon’ble High Court’s well-reasoned decision, involving a significant amount of delay in legal proceedings by reaffirming the principle that “sufficient cause” under Section (5) of the Limitation Act, 1963 must be adequately demonstrated as to why the appeal was not filed within the prescribed period, underscoring its implications for both private and governmental litigants.

In the following sections of this article, a comprehensive analysis of this judgment, the legal principles governing the Condonation of delay under Section (5) of the Limitation Act 1963, and the broader implications of this decision on finding the right balance between substantive justice and procedural requirements of the law have been discussed. 

 

BRIEF FACTS OF THE CASE

In the instant case, a dispute for the land measuring to a total extent of 1300 hectares situated in the District Katni, arose between the parties for title and possession, wherein the Petitioner, i.e., the State of Madhya Pradesh, claimed a specific portion of land to have been illegally declared under the possession of the Respondent, i.e., Mr. Rajkumar Choudhary.

Hence the Respondent filed a Civil Suit before the Civil Judge, seeking a declaration of title and permanent injunction for specific lands, claiming leasehold rights since 1989. The Trial Court, however, dismissed the said suit in 2013, favouring the Petitioner.

Thereafter, the Respondent challenged the Trial Court’s order, preferring a Civil Appeal before the Additional District Judge, Katni. The matter was decided favoring the Respondent in 2014, reversing the Trial Court’s decision. The Petitioner further challenging the First Appellate Court’s decision filed a second appeal before the Hon’ble High Court of Madhya Pradesh on 18.10.2019 along with an Interlocutory Application seeking to condone the delay of 5 years, 10 months, and 16 days, i.e., 1788 days, in the filing of the same.

The Hon’ble High Court observed that the Petitioner’s application for condoning the delay lacked merit, citing negligence at multiple stages from the date of receipt of the judgment passed by the First Appellate Court to the date of filing the second appeal by the Petitioner. 

Consequently, the Hon’ble High Court dismissed the appeal, declining to condone the delay, emphasizing that bureaucratic inefficiencies and administrative negligence cannot constitute a ‘sufficient cause’ for condoning such an extraordinary delay.

Against this order of the Hon’ble High Court, the Petitioner filed a Special Leave Petition before the Hon’ble Supreme Court stating that the appeal was dismissed without considering the merits of the case, and alleging that the Petitioner’s rights in respect of the said land are adversely affected.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court dismissed the Petition filed before it, by the Petitioner, upholding the decision of the Hon’ble Court of Madhya Pradesh.

 

ISSUES

The primary legal issue entailed in the present case is-

  • Whether the High Court rightly dismissed the second appeal filed before it, due to an inordinate delay of 1788 days in filing it?
  • Whether limitation is merely a technical consideration and can the sword be hanging on the Decree holder for an indefinite period based on the whims and fancies of the appellant?

 

ANALYSIS OF THE CASE 

Upon analyzing the Judgment, the decision of the First Appeal holds little relevance as in the said First Appeal, the dispute regarding possession and title of the land was the sole subject matter which was resolved in favour of the Respondent. The decision of the First Appellate Court was subsequently challenged before the High Court through a Second Appeal, which was filed with a significant delay of 1,788 days.

As per Section (5) of the Limitation Act, 1963, “Any appeal or any application, other than an application under any of the provisions of Order XXI of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (5 of 1908), may be admitted after the prescribed period if the appellant or the applicant satisfies the court that he had sufficient cause for not preferring the appeal or making the application within such period.”

Upon scrutinizing Sec (5), it can be inferred that delay may be condoned, provided the appellant satisfies the court by furnishing ‘sufficient cause.’ In the instant case, there was a delay of approximately one year by the government advocate representing the Petitioner in notifying the Collector about the judgment passed by the First Appellate Court. Additionally, there was a three-month delay in communicating the judgment to the Principal Secretary of the Revenue Department. Subsequently, the Law and Legislative Department caused a further delay of nearly three years in deciding whether to file a second appeal in the matter. Thereafter the Petitioner filed the second appeal almost a year after receiving confirmation from the Law Department.

Consequently, the Hon’ble High Court’s stand in dismissing the Second Appeal was correct, as in the instant case, the reasons cited by the Petitioner, such as internal procedural delays and lack of timely communication among officials, were deemed insufficient by the Hon’ble High Court. 

The Hon’ble High Court observing the same referred to the precedent set in the case of the State of U.P. through Executive Engineer and Anr. Vs. Amarnath Yadav, wherein it underscores that government departments are bound by the same limitation laws as private entities and cannot use procedural inefficiencies as an excuse for delay. It highlights that condonation of delay is an exception, and not a right, and requires a ‘sufficient cause’ as to why the litigant did not approach the court within the period of limitation.

Further, in the instant case, the Petitioner alleged in its Petition, that The Hon’ble High Court erred by dismissing the second appeal without hearing the case’s merits. The Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to the judgment in  Union of India v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy (D) through his legal heir, wherein it was held that the courts must first assess the bona fides of the explanation for condoning the delay, before considering the merits of the main matter. Hence the Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the High Court made no error in dismissing the appeal. 

Further, as per Sec (5) sufficient reason must be furnished as to why the appeal couldn’t be filed ‘within the prescribed period.’ The Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to the case of Ajit Singh Thakur Singh and Another v. State of Gujarat, AIR 1981 SC 733, and concluded that, once the litigant has allowed the limitation period to expire, then the “sufficient cause” must relate to circumstances that arose before the limitation expired, as delays due to events after the expiration are irrelevant for condonation.

The Court highlighted that the rules of limitation are not mere technicalities but serve to protect the rights of the opposing party and uphold the finality of judgments. In the instant case, even though governmental interests were involved, the Hon’ble Supreme Court reiterated that condoning such delays, would not only undermine the legislative intent behind Sec (5) but also create inequity by disrupting the balance of rights between the parties. Therefore, strict adherence to limitation provisions remains a cornerstone of legal discipline.

The Hon’ble Apex Court, therefore upheld the High Court’s decision, by dismissing the petition and imposing costs to establish a precedent discouraging the misuse of the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s time by filing appeals against well-reasoned and deliberate High Court judgments without valid grounds.

 

CONCLUSION

The Hon’ble Supreme Court by dismissing the Special Leave Petition filed by the Petitioner, upheld the principles laid down under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 and held that while invoking the provision of Sec 5 one must note that sufficient cause is furnished to justify why the appeal/application was not furnished within the specified period of limitation.

In the instant case, the Petitioner failed to provide sufficient cause to justify the inordinate delay of nearly six years in filing the second appeal. The Court emphasized that provisions of Sec 5 can not be interpreted liberally just because the litigant is a government or that governmental interests are at involved.

By refusing to condone such a prolonged delay, the Court reaffirmed that limitation laws are grounded in public policy and equity, preventing indefinite litigation. Furthermore, the imposition of costs underscores the need for accountability within government machinery to ensure timely and systematic handling of legal matters. This judgment serves as a reminder to both private and public litigants of the importance of adhering to procedural timelines to avoid undermining judicial integrity and efficiency.