Periyammal (Dead) Through LRs & Ors. v. V. Rajamani & Anr. Etc.

The judgment pertains to the execution of a decree in a suit for the specific performance of a sale agreement, addressing issues of possession, obstruction, and execution proceedings. The Supreme Court, in its detailed analysis, adjudicated upon the objections raised by the respondents regarding their possession as cultivating tenants and the procedural aspects of execution under CPC.


Factual Background

Agreement to Sell (1980)

One Ayyavoo Udayar, father of the appellants, entered into an agreement of sale dated 30.06.1980 with Ramanujan and Jagadeesan (Respondents Nos. 3 & 4, hereinafter referred to as the “vendors”). The suit property was agreed to be sold for a total consideration of ₹67,000/-. An earnest money deposit of ₹10,000/- was paid at the time of entering into the agreement, with the balance amount of ₹57,000/- to be paid on or before 15.11.1980, upon which the vendors were required to execute the sale deed in favour of Ayyavoo Udayar.

Failure to Execute Sale Deed & Legal Proceedings

On 15.11.1980, Ayyavoo Udayar issued a telegram requesting the vendors to receive the balance consideration and execute the sale deed. The vendors responded, stating that they would execute the sale deed on 20.11.1980; however, they failed to do so. As a result, Ayyavoo Udayar was compelled to file O.S. No. 514 of 1983 before the Subordinate Judge, Salem, seeking:

  • Specific performance of the agreement.
  • Execution & registration of the sale deed.
  • Delivery of possession of the suit property.

Involvement of Respondent Nos. 1 & 2

Respondent Nos. 1 & 2, who are the sons of the vendors’ sister, were impleaded in the suit as they were inducted into the suit property to create an appearance that they were in possession. However, Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 chose not to contest the suit and allowed it to proceed ex parte against them.

Trial Court’s Decree (1986)

On 02.04.1986, the Additional Subordinate Judge, Salem, decreed the suit as prayed for and directed:

  • The vendors are to execute the sale deed within one month of the decree.
  • If the vendors failed to comply, the Court would execute the sale deed.
  • Delivery of possession of the suit property to the appellants.

Appeals by Vendors

  • First Appeal: The High Court of Madras modified the decree slightly; Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 did not appear in the appeal.
  • Second Appeal: A Division Bench of the Madras High Court dismissed the appeal on 19.03.2004, subject to the condition that the appellants deposit an additional amount of ₹67,000/- within one month.
  • Special Leave Petition (SLP) before the Supreme Court:
    • The vendors filed an SLP challenging the High Court’s judgment, which was dismissed on 20.01.2006.
    • A subsequent Review Petition was also dismissed on 18.04.2006.

Execution Proceedings & Obstruction

  • The appellants filed R.E.P. No. 237 of 2004 seeking execution of the sale deed and delivery of possession.
  • On 17.08.2007, the Executing Court executed the registered sale deed on behalf of the vendors and Respondent Nos. 1 & 2.
  • Objection by Vendors:
    • The vendors challenged the inclusion of Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 in the sale deed.
    • The High Court allowed the deletion of their names on 08.01.2008, following which a rectification deed was executed on 25.01.2008.

Obstruction in Execution & Fresh Proceedings by Respondent Nos. 1 & 2

  • On 12.02.2008, the Executing Court ordered delivery of possession to the appellants.
  • When court officials arrived at the site, Respondent No. 1 obstructed the execution, threatening self-immolation.
  • R.E.A. No. 163 of 2011:
    • Respondents Nos. 1 & 2 filed an application under Section 47 CPC, claiming:
      • No notice was served to them before execution.
      • They were not bound by the sale deed after their names were deleted.
      • The appellants committed fraud.
    • The Additional Subordinate Judge (ASJ), Salem, allowed the application on 12.08.2011, holding that:
      • Respondents Nos. 1 & 2 were in possession.
      • No relief for possession was sought against them in execution.
      • The appellants must take separate legal proceedings to obtain possession.

Further Execution Proceedings by Appellants

  • The appellants challenged this order by filing Civil Revision Petition (NPD) No. 4311 of 2011 before the High Court.
  • They also filed R.E.A. No. 14 of 2012 & R.E.A. No. 145 of 2013 seeking amendments in execution proceedings.
  • On 24.04.2015, the ASJ rejected the amendments, citing:
    • Delay of seven and a half years in seeking amendment.
    • Finality of the Section 47 order.

Final Challenge Before High Court (2019)

  • The appellants filed Civil Revision Petition (NPD) No. 2151 of 2015 before the Madras High Court.
  • The High Court dismissed both revision petitions on 18.12.2019, holding that:
    • No notice was served to Respondent Nos. 1 & 2 before execution.
    • Amendments to the execution petition were non-maintainable after the Section 47 application was allowed.


Observations Of The Court

The Supreme Court acknowledged the longstanding nature of the dispute and the repeated procedural hurdles that had delayed the enforcement of the decree. The judgment emphasized the difficulties faced by decree-holders in execution proceedings and the necessity of ensuring that procedural laws do not become instruments of injustice.

One of the primary issues examined by the Court was whether Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, who had remained ex parte in the original suit, could obstruct the execution of the decree on the grounds of possession. The Court scrutinized the findings of the Executing Court, which had upheld their objections under Section 47 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (CPC), and had directed the decree-holders to pursue separate legal proceedings to obtain possession. The appellants contended that the High Court erred in affirming this view, particularly in light of the fact that the decree expressly provided for the delivery of possession.

The Court also delved into the statutory scheme governing execution proceedings, particularly the interplay between Section 47 CPC and Order XXI Rules 97 to 101 CPC. The Court reaffirmed that an executing court is competent to decide all questions relating to execution, discharge, or satisfaction of the decree, including those concerning possession, without requiring the decree-holder to initiate fresh litigation. It was observed that once a decree for specific performance and possession is passed, the decree-holder should not be compelled to undertake additional proceedings merely because the judgment-debtor or third parties attempt to obstruct its enforcement.

In its analysis, the Court considered the nature of the objections raised by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2. It noted that these respondents had neither contested the original suit nor the appellate proceedings, yet they sought to resist execution at a belated stage by invoking their alleged possession as cultivating tenants. The Court expressed concern over the apparent collusion between the vendors and Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, highlighting the fact that the vendors had themselves facilitated the deletion of Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 from the sale deed, thereby enabling them to later claim that they were not bound by it. The Court found this sequence of events to be an attempt to frustrate the decree and deprive the appellants of their rightful relief.

The judgment also examined the argument advanced by the respondents regarding their alleged status as cultivating tenants under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955. The respondents contended that as cultivating tenants, they could not be evicted through civil court proceedings and that the jurisdiction of the civil courts was barred in such matters. The Supreme Court, however, scrutinized the evidence on record and found that there was no substantive proof to support the respondents’ claim of tenancy. It was noted that the inclusion of their names in revenue records was a recent development and had only been effected after the decree had attained finality, raising serious doubts about its authenticity. Furthermore, the Court held that the jurisdictional bar under the said Act would not apply in the absence of a legally recognized tenancy agreement or conclusive proof of tenancy rights.

In this case, the appellants’ attempt to amend the execution petition to explicitly include relief against Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 was deemed to be within the permissible framework. The Court criticized the High Court’s rigid approach in rejecting the amendments on technical grounds, emphasizing that procedural rules should serve the cause of justice rather than frustrate it.

While addressing the conduct of the parties, the Court observed that Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had failed to assert any independent right in a timely manner and had only sought to obstruct execution when it was at the final stage. Their non-participation in the original suit, the appellate proceedings, and the earlier execution proceedings demonstrated a clear pattern of delaying tactics. The Court reiterated that execution proceedings should not be converted into a forum for relitigating issues that had already been settled by a final decree.


References To Precedents And Legal Principles

The Court reiterated that an executing court is not merely a mechanical body for implementing decrees but has the power to decide all disputes related to execution, including claims of third-party obstruction.

A key precedent relied upon was Brahmdeo Chaudhary v. Rishikesh Prasad Jaiswal, (1997) 3 SCC 697 [1], where the Supreme Court had held that when a decree-holder faces resistance or obstruction in execution, he must move an application under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC, and the executing court is bound to adjudicate upon the objections. The Court reaffirmed that such adjudication must be comprehensive, addressing all claims related to possession, title, or rights in the property.

The Court also placed reliance on Shreenath v. Rajesh, (1998) 4 SCC 543 [2], which had broadened the interpretation of Order XXI Rule 97 CPC to include claims by persons not bound by the decree. In that case, the Supreme Court had emphasized that procedural laws must be interpreted in a manner that prevents unnecessary multiplicity of proceedings. Applying this principle, the Court in the present case held that Respondent Nos. 1 and 2, having failed to contest the original suit, could not be allowed to use execution proceedings as a forum to assert fresh rights.

Further, the Supreme Court cited Silverline Forum Pvt. Ltd. v. Rajiv Trust, (1998) 3 SCC 723 [3], where it had been held that even third parties, including transferees pendente lite, can offer resistance in execution, but such resistance must be adjudicated under Order XXI Rule 97 CPC rather than being left for determination in separate proceedings. The Court applied this principle to conclude that Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 should have raised their claims in the original suit rather than waiting until execution.

The Court considered State of Bihar v. Bihar Rajya Bhumi Vikas Bank Samiti, (2018) 9 SCC 472 [4], where it was held that procedural rules should be construed in a manner that advances the cause of justice rather than defeating it. Applying this to the present case, the Supreme Court held that the High Court’s refusal to permit the amendment to the execution petition was an excessively technical approach that resulted in injustice to the appellants.

The Court also relied on Smriti Debbarma v. Prabha Ranjan Debbarma, 2023 SCC OnLine SC 9 [5], which reaffirmed that a party in possession cannot be dispossessed unless the decree-holder establishes a superior legal right. However, the Court distinguished this precedent by emphasizing that in the present case, the appellants had already obtained a final decree for possession, and the issue of title was no longer open for adjudication.

With respect to the jurisdiction of the executing court to decide tenancy claims, the Supreme Court referred to Sunder Dass v. Ram Prakash, (1977) 2 SCC 662 [6], which had laid down that an executing court cannot question the validity of a decree unless the court that passed the decree inherently lacked jurisdiction. The Court applied this principle to reject the respondents’ contention that the civil courts lacked jurisdiction due to their alleged status as cultivating tenants. It held that since there was no conclusive proof of tenancy, the bar under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955 was inapplicable.


Final Judgment And Disposition

The Court set aside the orders passed by the High Court of Madras and the Additional Subordinate Judge, Salem, which upheld the objections raised by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 under Section 47 CPC and rejected the amendments sought by the appellants in the execution petition.

The Court held that the decree for specific performance and delivery of possession had attained finality, and the executing court was bound to enforce it without requiring the decree-holders to institute separate proceedings for possession. It observed that Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 had failed to establish any independent legal right over the suit property, and their resistance was a clear attempt to frustrate the decree in collusion with the vendors. The Court further noted that no substantial evidence was produced to prove that the respondents were cultivating tenants entitled to protection under the Tamil Nadu Cultivating Tenants’ Protection Act, 1955.

In strong terms, the Court criticized the technical approach adopted by the High Court, particularly its refusal to allow amendments in the execution petition. It reiterated that procedural laws should be interpreted in a manner that facilitates justice rather than obstructs it. The Court also expressed its disapproval of the inordinate delay in execution proceedings, emphasizing that a decree-holder must not be compelled to engage in multiple rounds of litigation merely to enjoy the fruits of a decree lawfully obtained.

Accordingly, the Supreme Court:

  1. Allowed the appeals and restored the execution proceedings initiated by the appellants.
  2. Directed the executing court to ensure immediate delivery of possession of the suit property to the appellants.
  3. Rejected the objections raised by Respondent Nos. 1 and 2 under Section 47 CPC and held that they had no lawful claim over the suit property.
  4. Permitted the amendments sought by the appellants in the execution petition, recognizing them as procedural clarifications rather than substantive changes.
  5. Directed that execution be carried out expeditiously, warning against any further obstruction or delay tactics.

This decision marks a significant ruling in the realm of execution law, reinforcing the comprehensive adjudicatory powers of the executing court and ensuring that decree-holders are not subjected to unnecessary procedural entanglements.


[1] https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1203615/

[2] https://indiankanoon.org/doc/255914/

[3] https://indiankanoon.org/doc/311833/

[4] https://indiankanoon.org/doc/36469640/

[5] https://indiankanoon.org/doc/147942338/

[6]https://indiankanoon.org/doc/1906169/#:~:text=The%20appellant%20filed%20a%20suit,the%20Civil%20Court%20was%20barred