The Hon’ble Supreme Court of India, in the matter of New Mangalore Port Trust v. Clifford D’Souza, Civil Appeal No. 2453 of 2014, delivered a judgement on 27th March 2024, adjudicating upon the applicability of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963 to proceedings initiated under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (hereinafter referred to as “the Public Premises Act”).

The matter was heard by a bench comprising Hon’ble Mr. Justice B.R. Gavai and Hon’ble Mr. Justice Sandeep Mehta, wherein the principal issue before the Court was whether an acknowledgement of liability made in writing, as contemplated under Section 18 of the Limitation Act, would extend the period of limitation for recovery of arrears of rent/damages under the Public Premises Act.

The factual matrix reveals that Clifford D’Souza, the respondent, was in occupation of certain premises belonging to the New Mangalore Port Trust (hereinafter “the appellant”) on the basis of a lease agreement. The lease expired in September 2000, and despite such expiry, the respondent continued to occupy the premises unauthorisedly. Consequently, the appellant initiated proceedings under the Public Premises Act before the Estate Officer, claiming damages amounting to Rs. 6,58,098.74, along with interest at the rate of 18% per annum.

An acknowledgement dated 19th April 2004, signed by the respondent, expressly admitted the outstanding dues and contained a clear promise to pay the amount in instalments. The proceedings before the Estate Officer, culminated in an order dated 25th October 2006, directing the respondent to pay the aforesaid sum.

Aggrieved by the same, the respondent preferred an appeal under Section 9 of the Public Premises Act before the District Judge, Dakshina Kannada, which was dismissed. The High Court of Karnataka, in a writ petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, reversed the findings of the authorities below, holding that the proceedings were barred by limitation and that the acknowledgement could not extend the period thereof.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court, while setting aside the judgment of the High Court, reiterated the applicability of Section 18 of the Limitation Act even to proceedings under the Public Premises Act, and observed that the acknowledgement dated 19th April 2004, was sufficient to extend the limitation period.


Analysis Of Statutory Framework And Judicial Interpretation

At the heart of the present controversy lies the interplay between the Limitation Act, 1963, particularly Section 18, and the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971.

Section 18 of the Limitation Act provides that where, before the expiration of the prescribed period for any suit or application in respect of any property or right, an acknowledgement of liability in respect of such property or right is made in writing and signed by the party against whom the right is claimed, a fresh period of limitation shall be computed from the time when the acknowledgement was so signed.

The respondent contended before the High Court and reiterated before the Supreme Court that since the Public Premises Act is a special legislation, the provisions of the Limitation Act would not apply unless expressly provided. Reliance was placed on Section 15 of the Public Premises Act, which gives the Act an overriding effect.

However, the Hon’ble Supreme Court referred to its previous pronouncements, particularly in S.S. Rathore v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (1989) 4 SCC 582 [1] and P. Radha Bai v. P. Ashok Kumar, (2018) 13 SCC 343 [2], to hold that in the absence of an express exclusion, the Limitation Act applies to proceedings under special statutes, provided such proceedings are quasi-judicial or civil in nature. It further relied on Ganga Dutt Murarka v. Kartik Chandra Das, AIR 1961 SC 1067[3] and Fairgrowth Investments Ltd. v. Custodian, (2004) 11 SCC 472 [4], to reinforce the proposition that Section 18 is applicable where the acknowledgement is unequivocal and in writing.

The Hon’ble Court observed that the proceedings before the Estate Officer under the Public Premises Act are adjudicatory in nature, involving determination of rights and liabilities akin to a civil court, thereby justifying the application of the Limitation Act.

In paragraph 13 of the judgment, the bench unequivocally held:

“We are of the considered view that the High Court was not justified in holding that the acknowledgement made by the respondent in writing on 19.04.2004 could not be construed to extend the period of limitation under Section 18 of the Limitation Act.”

The Court was categorical in stating that an acknowledgement of liability made in writing within the period of limitation would give rise to a fresh limitation period and that the Estate Officer was well within his jurisdiction in acting upon such acknowledgement for the purpose of computing limitation.

This judicial exposition thus clarifies the jurisprudential position regarding the incorporation of Section 18 within the framework of the Public Premises Act, notwithstanding its status as a special legislation.


Factual Determination And Evidentiary Basis For Acknowledgment

The appellant initiated proceedings under Sections 4 and 7 of the Public Premises Act before the Estate Officer, asserting a claim of Rs. 6,58,098.74 towards damages for unauthorised use and occupation, in addition to interest at 18% per annum.

The linchpin of the appellant’s claim was an acknowledgement letter dated 19.04.2004, signed by the respondent, wherein he admitted the outstanding dues and proposed to pay the amount in instalments. The acknowledgement read as under:

“I hereby undertake to pay the entire outstanding dues in respect of the premises… in monthly instalments… I acknowledge my liability towards the Port Trust and request for leniency in terms of payment schedule.”

The Estate Officer, relying upon this acknowledgement, passed an order on 25.10.2006, directing the respondent to pay the arrears, including interest. The respondent’s appeal under Section 9 of the Public Premises Act before the District Judge was dismissed and the said order was upheld.

However, the High Court of Karnataka, in Writ Petition No. 10154 of 2008, allowed the respondent’s plea, holding that the claim was barred by limitation and that the acknowledgement did not extend the limitation period under the Public Premises Act.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court critically evaluated the evidentiary nature of the acknowledgement. In paragraph 10 of the judgment, the Court noted:

“The acknowledgement dated 19.04.2004, being within the limitation period, clearly satisfies the requirements of Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963… It is not open to the High Court to brush aside such a categorical acknowledgement.”

The bench further recorded that the acknowledgement was not disputed by the respondent and was a voluntary and unambiguous admission of liability, thus attracting the consequences envisaged under Section 18.

Thus, the judgment squarely reinforces that an admission in writing, duly signed and acknowledging liability, even in proceedings under the Public Premises Act, is capable of restarting the limitation period, thereby affording statutory relief to public authorities in pursuit of arrears and damages.


Judicial Reasoning And Final Determination

The Hon’ble Supreme Court’s reasoning in setting aside the High Court’s judgment rests upon a meticulous interpretation of the interplay between special statutes and general law, particularly the co-existence of the Public Premises Act and the Limitation Act.

In paragraph 14 of the judgment, the Court elucidated:

“The Public Premises Act does not contain any specific provision prescribing a limitation period for recovery of arrears. In such a scenario, it cannot be presumed that the legislature intended to exclude the applicability of the Limitation Act.”

This observation is consistent with the well-established jurisprudence that, in the absence of an express exclusion, the provisions of the Limitation Act, being procedural in nature, would apply to all civil proceedings, whether before ordinary courts or before tribunals or quasi-judicial authorities.

The Court further invoked the principle laid down in Bharat Sanchar Nigam Limited v. Nortel Networks India Pvt. Ltd., (2021) 5 SCC 738 [5], to reinforce that acknowledgment of liability resets the clock for limitation, and that procedural defences should not defeat substantive justice, especially when the debtor has unequivocally acknowledged the debt.

The final determination in paragraph 15 of the judgment reads:

“We are of the considered view that the appeal deserves to be allowed. The impugned judgment of the High Court dated 22.02.2013 is set aside, and the orders of the Estate Officer and the District Judge are restored.”

This ruling not only settles the ambiguity regarding limitation in such statutory proceedings but also sends a clear message that public undertakings are entitled to rely on admissions of liability to pursue claims otherwise perceived to be time-barred.


Conclusion

The judgment in New Mangalore Port Trust v. Clifford D’Souza lays down a significant precedent concerning the harmonious construction of general and special laws, reaffirming that Section 18 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is applicable even to recovery proceedings initiated under the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971, unless expressly excluded.

This decision bears significant implications for statutory authorities, port trusts, and other public bodies, which frequently face the hurdle of limitation in eviction and recovery proceedings. With this authoritative pronouncement by the Hon’ble Supreme Court, such bodies may now safely rely upon written acknowledgements of liability to extend or revive the period of limitation, provided such acknowledgements are made within the subsisting period of limitation and satisfy the conditions under Section 18.

[1] https://indiankanoon.org/doc/317602/
[2]https://digiscr.sci.gov.in/view_judgment?id=NDM4MA==
[3]https://indiankanoon.org/doc/243457/
[4]https://indiankanoon.org/doc/558636/
[5]https://indiankanoon.org/doc/118956979/