Compensation is Not a Substitute for Punishment

Rajendra Bhagwanji Umraniya Versus State of Gujarat (Criminal Appeal nos. 2481-2482 of 2024)

The question whether ‘Can a Convictwalk away freely by simply paying the compensation to the victim’ has been raised in the present case wherein,p aying compensation to the victim under Section 357 of the Criminal Procedure Code (CR.P.C.), 1973 is perceived as a ‘favour’, leading convicts on this ground to seek a reduction in their sentence.

In the case of Rajendra Bhagwanji Umraniya Versus the State of Gujarat, the Hon’ble Supreme Court observed whether compensation could be an alternative to the punishment, ultimately reinforcing the principle that both punishment and compensation to the victim stand on a different footing, one being punitive in nature and the latter being restitutory in nature, and therefore cannot be used interchangeably.

In the following sections of this article, a comprehensive analysis of this judgment, the legal principles governing, the powers of the Court to award compensation to the victims of the offence under Section 357 of the CR.P.C., 1973, and the broader implications of this decision on the Criminal Justice Administration System.

BRIEF FACTS

The instant case, originated in the year 2012, wherein the Appellant i.e., Mr Rajendra Bhagwanji Umraniya filed an F.I.R. against five accused persons at Surendranagar City Police Station for various offences of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and Gujarat Police Act, and only two out of the five accused persons were named, i.e., accused no. 1 and 2 (respondents herein).

The two accused ultimately being put to trial before the Sessions Court of Surendranagar in Sessions Case No. 14/2013 and were therefore convicted under Section 325 and 323 of the IPC and Section 135 of the Gujarat Police Act. The Sessions Court vide Impugned Judgment/ Order dated 31.05.2014 sentenced the accused to undergo:

  • Sec 325 of IPC- Five years of rigorous imprisonment along with a fine of Rs. 5,000/- each.
  •  Sec 323 of IPC- Rigorous imprisonment of one year and:
  • Sec 135 of the Gujarat Police Act- Rigorous imprisonment of one year along with a fine of Rs. 1,000/-.

Furthermore, the Sessions Court acquitted Accused No. 3, 4, and 5 who were not named in the FIR.

Thereafter, being aggrieved by the Impugned Judgment/Order dated 31.05.2014 passed by the Session Court, five appeals were filed before the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat, out of which two appeals, i.e. Criminal Appeal Nos 906 of 2014 and 1330 of 2014 were preferred by the Appellant, one for seeking enhancement of punishment and the connected appeal challenging the acquittal of the other three accused, two appeals i.e., Criminal Appeal Nos 723 of 2014 and 733 of 2014 were preferred by the convicted accused against the order of conviction and sentence and the Respondent i.e., the State of Gujarat preferred an appeal challenging the acquittal of accused no. 3 to 5.

The Hon’ble High Court disposed of all five appeals by a common judgment, thereby modifying the Impugned Order passed by the Ld. Session Judge reduced the sentence of five years of rigorous imprisonment to four years and further allowed the respondents to be released from the imprisonment, upon the payment of the compensation to the accused.

Against this order of the Hon’ble High Court, the Appellant approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court, challenging the reduction in the sentence of the respondent and further comparing compensation awarded to the victim with the substantive order of the sentence, which is not in accordance with the law.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court held that the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat committed an error thereby reversing the part of the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat’s findings which had reduced the sentence imposed on convicts after the victim was compensated.


Legal Issues Raised

  1. Whether victim compensation can justify a reduction in sentencing?
  2. Whether Section 357 of the CrPC allow victimology principles to substitute punitive measures?


Analysis Of The Judgment

Upon analyzing the Judgment, the decision of the Session Court holds little relevance as the primary issue arose from the Hon’ble High Court’s modification of sentencing based on compensation.

As per Section 357 (1) (b) of CRPC, 1973 “When a Court imposes a sentence of fine or a sentence (including a sentence of death) of which fine forms a part, the Court may passing judgment, order the whole or any part of the fine recovered to be applied—in the payment to any person of compensation for any loss or injury caused by the offence, when compensation is, in the opinion of the Court, recoverable by such person in a civil court; ”

Upon scrutinizing Section 357 (1) (b) of the CR. P.C., it is evident that this provision is victim-centric, i.e., focuses on the rehabilitation of the victim for any loss/ injury suffered by him and has nothing to do with the convict or the sentence passed. In the instant case, the Hon’ble High Court reduced the sentence from five years of rigorous imprisonment to four years, thereby upholding the awarded sentence and conviction of the Respondents, however by asking each of the Respondents that if an amount of Rs. 2,50,000/-, totalling Rs. 5,00,000/- is paid before the Registry of the concerned Session Court within ten weeks from the date of the Order, they need not undergo even four years of the sentence.

The Hon’ble High Court’s reasoning blurred the line between punitive measures and restitutory measures by treating victim compensation as a means to override imprisonment, thereby creating a fundamental legal misinterpretation. Furthermore, the Hon’ble High Court erred in relying upon the precedent set by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Ankush Shivaji Gaikwad v. State of Maharashtra (2013), as indeed this judgment emphasized the importance of awarding compensations to the victim, however, it never suggested that compensation should be treated as an alternative to punishment.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court relying on the judgment itself in Maru Ram Vs Union of India & Others, 1981 (1) SCC 107 and Hari Singh vs Sukhbir Singh and Others, 1988 (4) SCC 551, wherein it underscores that the power of Courts under Section 357 of CR.P.C. to provide compensation to the victim while passing judgment, is not ancillary to other sentences but in addition thereto. This power is intended to ensure that the victim is not forgotten and the compensation is therefore provided as a restorative measure which is completely distinct from the sentence passed as a punitive measure.

Further, as per Section 357 of CR.P.C., the sole factor for deciding the compensation to be paid is the victim’s loss or injury as a result of the offence and has nothing to do with the sentence that has been passed. The Court addressing the larger issue of economic disparity in our society, observed that if financial compensation were allowed to replace punitive sentences, wealthy convicts could exploit this loophole to avoid incarceration, leading to unequal treatment under the law.

Therefore, the Hon’ble Supreme Court set aside the Hon’ble High Court’s decision to permit compensation as a substitute for imprisonment. However, considering that twelve years have already elapsed since the incident and the convicts have already paid Rs. FiveLakhs, the Hon’ble Court exercised its judicial discretion and thereby directed the accused to pay an additional amount of Rs. Five Lakhs each, totalling to Rs. Ten lakhs, in addition to what has already been deposited before the trial court, bringing to a total compensation of Rs. Fifteen Lakhs.


Conclusion

The Hon’ble Supreme Court by setting aside the erroneous approach of the Hon’ble High Court of Gujarat, upheld the principles laid down under Section 357 of CR.P.C. and held that the Courts while invoking the provision of Sec 357, must ensure that the compensation awarded to the victim is not ancillary to other sentences, but it is in addition thereto.

In the instant case, the Hon’ble High Court erroneously misapplied the provisions of Sec 357, thereby substituting the punitive punishment with restitutory compensation.

The Hon’ble Supreme Court recognized that adopting such an approach would erode the confidence of the public in the Criminal justice administration system, as it would create a perception that punishment is negotiable based on financial status. The reinforcement of this principle serves as a reminder that justice cannot be bought and that the legal consequences cannot be avoided through monetary settlements, ensuring equal application of the law to all, regardless of wealth or status.